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Derek W. Bowettt
In his introduction to the Special Feature in the Fall 1984 issue of the
Yale Journal of International Law,I Professor Reisman proclaimed the
study of "incidents" as a "new genre in the study of international law."
'2
Although Reisman's article is challenging, innovative, and eminently
readable-as one would expect from his pen-one must nevertheless
question whether the incident methodology is truly a new genre, as he
claims, or whether this belief is simply a delusion which distracts us from
the more serious problems of studying international law.
Certainly, the claims made for this new method are significant. It is
envisaged as "a positive first step in restoring rational, deliberative law-
making in the international community' 3 and "a type of 'meta-law,' pro-
viding normative guidelines for decisionmakers in the international
system in those vast deserts in which case law is sparse."'4 It is further
claimed that incident studies, if taken up by other scholars, ultimately
"can ... yield an abundant literature of international appraisal, richer
than the limited number of cases decided by courts... [and] more accu-
rate in expressing international normative expectations."' 5 Moreover, it
is clear that Reisman sees this new method as replacing, to some extent,
the traditional examination of the formal sources of international law,
such as treaties, custom, and judicial and arbitral decisions.
6
It may be useful to pose two separate questions. First, why is a new
method of study felt to be necessary? And, second, what is its likely
utility?
t Whewell Professor of International Law, Cambridge University.
1. Special Feature, The Incident as a Decisional Unit in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1 (1984). The Special Feature, along with additional incident studies, will appear in
book form in the summer of 1987 as INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS
IN WORLD POLITICS (W. Reisman & A. Willard eds. 1987).
2. Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of Interna-
tional Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id. at 19.
5. Id.
6. Reisman concedes, however, the doubtful utility of this new method in persuading inter-
national tribunals, since such tribunals are likely to be committed to applying a "wholly anach-
ronistic conception of international law." Id. at 19.
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I. The Rationale Behind the Search for a New Method
Inevitably, the case for a new method of study of international law
rests in part on a critique of the old. Yet Reisman is essentially criticiz-
ing international lawyers rather than the traditional methods of study as
such. His thesis is that decision-makers prefer to consult political scien-
tists rather than international lawyers because of the inadequacies of the
lawyers and the jurisprudential system in which they operate. He claims
that because lawyers tend to construct their "normative universe" from
texts, they are unable to predict accurately the responses of key actors to
any critical event (which the study of incidents would enable them to
do). Their advice is thus useless or, at best, of minimal relevance.
7
Reisman's criticism is harsh and, if true, constitutes quite an indict-
ment of government legal advisers. But is it true? Where is the evidence
to support this indictment? It is frankly inconceivable that the many
experienced and able international lawyers in foreign ministries, state de-
partments, and cabinet offices throughout the world are so inept and un-
worldly as to give advice to their governments that ignores the question
of how other governments will react to a particular course of action-if,
indeed, they are likely to react at all.
Furthermore, Reisman assumes that governments wish to have legal
advice on the likely consequences of the actions they contemplate, but
fail to seek it because their legal advisers are too unworldly or unrealistic.
There is, however, another possible explanation. It may be that govern-
ments, on occasion, simply do not want legal advice because they fear it
will be adverse to the action they wish to take, because it may tend to
inhibit their freedom of action, or because they simply are not concerned
with issues of legality.
We have little hard evidence either way, but this second explanation
seems as plausible as the first. Certainly, it was widely assumed in the
United Kingdom that the Anglo-French military invasion of the Suez in
1956 was undertaken by the British government without reference to the
Foreign Office Legal Adviser. One suspects the same may have been true
of the U.S. government's disastrous involvement in the 1961 Bay of Pigs
invasion, the Israeli air attacks in 1981 on the Osirak nuclear reactor in
Iraq, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or Argentina's 1982 inva-
sion of the Falkland Islands. The matter must remain one for conjecture,
since governments are unlikely to publicize the fact that they did not
seek, or did not follow, legal advice. The point, however, is that govern-
7. Id. at 4.
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ments may show scant respect for the law for reasons other than that the
legal advice they receive is anachronistic, unrealistic, or uninformed.
Reisman's thesis takes a kindlier view of the motives of governments.
His argument is not that governments have no respect for international
law, but rather that they seek legal advice more responsive to the practi-
cal concerns of political actors than traditional counsel appears to be.8 If,
however, we identify law as norms responsive to a government's political
concerns, but concede (as probably we must) that different governments
will have different political concerns, then what we are identifying is not
international law at all. International law must remain a body of rules
applicable to international society as a whole. Attempts to attach a politi-
cally partisan character to those rules will destroy the utility of interna-
tional law, for the nations of the world will not accept international rules
that yield a different answer to the question of whether an action is legal
depending on the identity of the actor.
II. The Utility of the Method
The selection of incidents for study and analysis is crucial to the new
method, and since the purpose of the study is to identify the reactions of
"functional elites" so as to obtain "a more accurate and reliable indicator
of what elites hold the law to be," 9 it follows that the only incidents of
any utility will be those in which reactions by these elites can be identi-
fied and recorded.
This immediately suggests that the method is one of very limited
scope. It is likely to be useful in relation to major instances of the use of
force or to significant claims of jurisdiction, such as the U.S. attempt to
exercise control over European corporations in the Soviet gas pipeline
incident; 10 in such cases one can expect demonstrable reactions from
elites. In practice, however, the vast majority of legal relations between
states are conducted in a bilateral context, and "incidents" in these cir-
cumstances are not likely to evoke any publicized reaction by other par-
ties. Even if it were argued that the silence of other states is itself a
reaction," how does one interpret this silence-is it approval, disap-
proval, or disinterest? Thus, in many contexts, the study of a bilateral
8. See id. at 2-5.
9. Id. at 12-13.
10. See DeSouza, The Soviet Gas Pipeline Incident: Extension of Collective Security Respon-
sibilities to Peacetime Commercial Trade, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 92 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Ratner, The Gulf of Sidra Incident of 1981: A Study of the Lawfuhless of




dispute as an "incident" is pointless because there are no reactions by
functional elites to be observed. Let us take some recent examples.
For the past five years, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the
Hague has been dealing with many hundreds of cases, and the case law
emerging from the Tribunal offers a fruitful source of study of rules relat-
ing to international monetary claims. The large number of learned arti-
cles about the Tribunal testifies to the utility of such study. 12 Yet, so far
as this writer is aware, none of the decisions of the Tribunal or argu-
ments of the parties before it have evoked any reactions from functional
elites. The incident method is therefore quite inappropriate to this area
of study.
Another example is the recent dispute between Canada and France
over the application of the 1972 Franco-Canadian Fisheries Treaty,
13
which led to an arbitral award on July 17, 1986.14 There, the essential
question was the legality of the Canadian exclusion (as a matter of policy
rather than by reference to conservation regulations) of factory-freezer
trawlers registered in St. Pierre et Miquelon from the fishery in the Gulf
of St. Lawrence. Necessarily, the argument on both sides (and prior ad-
vice to the two governments) had to be conducted on the basis of tradi-
tional sources: accepted rules of interpretation of treaties, arguments as
to the relationship between treaties and custom, and so forth. No resort
to the incident method of study was possible for the simple reason that
there were no reactions by third states-or "functional elites"-either
before or after the award. The dispute was typically bilateral, with third
states minding their own business. Indeed, this also could be said of the
U.S.-Canadian dispute over the Gulf of Maine.
15
More broadly, the same is true of the dispute between the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland over the continental shelf bound-
ary in the area of the Rockall Plateau. Although there have been reac-
tions by Iceland and Denmark, in the sense that both these states have
made competing claims to the Plateau, 16 it is not clear that any disinter-
12. See, e.g., Stewart & Sherman, Developments at the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal:
1981-1983, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1983); Stein, Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence: The Ira-
nian-Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
For the collected decisions of this tribunal, see IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL RE-
PORTS (1983-1986), vols. 1-6.
13. Agreement on Their Mutual Fishing Relations, Mar. 27, 1972, Canada-France, 862
U.N.T.S. 209.
14. Fishing Dispute (Can. v. Fr.), 90 REvuE Gf-:NRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC [R. GtN. DR. INT. PUB.] 713 (1986).
15. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12).
16. On May 7, 1985, the Danish government issued a "Provisional Administrative Mea-
sure" defining the Danish shelf in respect of the Faroes to include the Plateau; the United
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ested states-or their "functional elites"-have reacted at all to this com-
plex situation.
Similarly, in the current dispute between Israel and Egypt concerning
sovereignty over Tabah,1 7 notwithstanding the dispute's special impor-
tance in light of its implications for the stability of the Camp David
Agreements,18 no other state seems to have reacted. Rather than expres-
sing a view on the norms relied upon by the parties, the efforts of the
United States-perhaps the most interested third party-appear (very
prudently) to have been confined to persuading the two parties to arbi-
trate their dispute.
These examples could be multiplied many times. The point they make
is simply that any study of these disputes has to be by way of the normal,
traditional analysis: what are the claims of the parties, on what facts and
legal norms do they rely, from what sources are these norms derived, and
how, ultimately, does the settlement of the dispute either confirm or deny
such norms? The idea that one can test the validity of norms by refer-
ence to the reactions of functional elites does not work because there are
no such reactions.
Reisman and his associates might argue that these examples of interna-
tional claims and fishery, maritime, and territorial disputes are not major
international events that can be appropriately classified as "incidents." If
so, then it confirms the point made above that the method is of limited
scope. Moreover, even when we do examine significant international
events that might seem to be ideally suited for study using the incident
method, we often find that widespread reactions by international elites
simply have not occurred.
For example, on July 10, 1985, the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow War-
rior was sabotaged and sunk in a New Zealand port by French agents.19
The government of New Zealand apprehended and brought to trial the
two agents who appeared, on all the evidence, to have acted on behalf of
the French government. This episode seems to have all the characteris-
tics of an "incident." But in fact it cannot be usefully studied as one
because the reactions of foreign governments appear to have been limited
Kingdom protested on May 13, 1985. The Icelandic claim is contained in the Regulations of
May 9, 1985, issued under Law No. 41 of June 1, 1979; the United Kingdom protested by
Note of June 19, 1985.
17. The dispute has been submitted to arbitration. The formal opening of the ad hoc arbi-
tral tribunal took place in Geneva on December 10, 1986.
18. Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, March
26, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 362 (1979).
19. See Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux (France and New Zealand), 90 R.




to the United Kingdom's protest to France over the sinking of the vessel
(which was U.K.-registered), the Netherlands' protest over the death of
one of the crew (a Dutch national), and the Swiss protest over the unau-
thorized use of Swiss passports by the two French agents. 20 The key
issue, however, was whether New Zealand could properly indict govern-
ment agents for acts done in their official capacity or whether it should
have proceeded via an international claim against France. On that issue
there appear to have been no reactions.
There is, of course, one category of events about which there will al-
ways be significant governmental reaction: those which lead to discus-
sion and debate in an international forum, such as the specialized
agencies or regional organizations of the United Nations. Within these
organs, member states are required to express a view-to react- either
in debate or in voting on a resolution. Yet there is nothing terribly new
in the idea that one should analyze such reactions; indeed, such analysis
is a commonplace research technique. We do not need the new genre of
"incidents" to point us in this direction.
III. Difficulties in Applying the Method
Even assuming that in relation to particular incidents there are reac-
tions from functional elites beyond those which occur within the context
of traditional international forums, two further questions remain. First,
are these reactions sufficiently widespread to provide a reasonable repre-
sentation of the reaction of the international community to the norms in
question? And, second, have these reactions been correctly interpreted?
A. The Representative Character of the Reactions
Obviously, if in relation to a particular incident the United States re-
acted one way and the Soviet Union in a quite opposite way but other-
wise there were no reactions, one would be hard put to pronounce on the
validity of the norm in question. In other cases, the number of the reac-
tions may be so small as to raise serious doubts about their reliability as
indicators of a norm of general application.
The case studies in the Journal's Special Feature offer several good
illustrations of this problem. Sadurska's article on the problems faced by
Sweden due to the presence of Soviet submarines within its territorial
waters21 notes that international reactions were confined to protests by
20. See id. at 225.
21. Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Erosion of an International
Norm, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 34 (1984).
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Norway, Denmark, and Iceland and criticism of the submarines' nuclear
capacity by China, while the major Western powers remained silent.
Thus we have three protests and one rather ambiguous response. In
Ratner's article on the Gulf of Sidra incident,22 the analysis of interna-
tional reactions is confined to newspaper articles. However, except in the
case of Pravda in the Soviet Union, newspaper correspondents are
scarcely to be regarded as key elites. Thus, one has no idea how other
states reacted. In Cohen's article on the crash in Canadian territory of
the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954,23 the only international reactions identi-
fied are those of U.S. elites, and these reactions seem to be derived from
telephone conversations with Cohen, not published documents. (Do
elites answer telephone inquiries of this nature, or do low-level officials?)
DeSouza's article on the Soviet gas pipeline incident 24 is on surer
ground because, as is commonly known, there was an official reaction by
way of protest from the European Economic Community (EEC) on be-
half of all its members. Even so, DeSouza analyzes the reactions of only
the two disputants (the U.S. and the EEC); apart from Japan, no other
state seems to have adopted a position.
Thus, taking these four articles as examples, one might conclude that
even when other states react to an international incident, the reactions
may be insufficient in number to be useful and may not represent the
views of the key elites of these states. Another problem is that the reac-
tions of elites in states actually involved in "incidents" tend to be self-
serving and lacking in objectivity. This is particularly true if the elites
are government officials.
B. The Interpretation of the Reactions of Elites
The final question is how to interpret the responses of elites to interna-
tional incidents when there exist responses susceptible to analysis.
Clearly, if one views such reactions as establishing norms, it is important
to interpret these reactions accurately. Yet the articles under survey tes-
tify to the difficulties of interpretation.
For example, Cohen asserts that a new "norm of joint compensation"
appears to emerge from the Cosmos 954 incident.2 5 This interpretation is
based on Canada's having accepted an offer of U.S. assistance in cleaning
up the damage caused by a Soviet satellite and on the United States'
22. Ratner, supra note 11.
23. Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of Satellite Accidents, 10 YALE J. INT'L
L. 78 (1984).
24. DeSouza, supra note 10.




having incurred costs of $2 to 2.5 million which were not claimed from
the Soviet Union. However, we are given no clear evidence of the mo-
tives of the United States, and Cohen admits the payment may have been
ex gratia.26 To extrapolate from this one incident and postulate a norm
of joint compensation, in which even faultless satellite-launching nations
must contribute towards the cost of compensating an injured state, is
highly dubious. It seems unlikely that European satellite-launching
states would accept this "norm."
It may well be that Reisman would deny that an international norm
can be extracted from one incident. Thus a more cautious interpretation
would view one or more incidents as indicative of a trend, and therefore
as a basis for predicting likely conduct, and likely reactions, in the future.
If this is so, then the method of study is not new at all, for the traditional
methods of identifying customary rules involve the analysis of state prac-
tice, and state reactions, in a series of similar events. The only real differ-
ence is that a few incidents would form a basis for predicting future
conduct and responses, but would not constitute the kind of settled, uni-
form, and general practice needed to identify such conduct as obligatory
by custom.
Ratner's article affords another example of the difficulties of interpre-
tation. He interprets the Gulf of Sidra incident as relevant to the estab-
lishment of norms governing the application of Rules of Engagement
(ROE). 27 This interpretation, however, is altogether too technical. Cer-
tainly, the incident illustrates the scope of the right of self-defense, but
the conclusions that emerge are valid whether or not a state has issued
any ROE to its armed forces.
These examples illustrate the problems of interpreting state reactions
to incidents. Moreover, there is a more general difficulty that arises
whenever states react to an international incident: can one assume that a
particular state's reaction manifests a view about the norm at issue? In-
deed, this question has been faced for many years by writers concerned
with evaluating voting patterns or statements made in the context of in-
ternational organs. The fact is that states tend to vote or speak forpolit-
ical reasons largely divorced from considerations of legality.28 Bloc
26. Id. at 89.
27. Ratner, supra note 11, at 75-77.
28. See Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standard at the United Nations?,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 830-31 (1984). For example, Israel has consistently rejected resolu-
tions or pronouncements on the Middle East crisis made in UN organs, claiming that they
have no objective validity as statements of the legality of Israel's actions. See, e.g., Blum, The
Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 73, 98-104 (1970)
(discussing the dominance of political concerns in UN votes on the Arab-Israeli conflict).
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voting and statements in support of another state's position based en-
tirely on political affiliation do not necessarily tell us a great deal about
how states view the underlying norm. In another context, with different
actors, they might take a very different position on the same basic legal
issue.
Let us take the Falklands episode as an illustration. On April 3, 1982,
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 502, demanding the imme-
diate withdrawal of all Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands.
29
Yet on May 29, 1982, the Organization of American States (OAS) by
resolution condemned the United Kingdom's "armed attack" on the is-
lands.30 If the nations of the world agreed in the UN Security Council
that the Falklands invasion was violative of international law, how does
one interpret the reactions of the elites representing OAS member states?
It may well be that any search for normative rules of conduct entirely
misses the point, for the OAS resolution is better seen as a political ex-
pression of hemispheric solidarity than as a reflection of normative rules.
Moreover, extrapolation would be highly dangerous. The OAS elites
might react quite differently if Mexico sought to recover parts of Texas
or California from the United States, or if Morocco sought to expel Spain
from the Spanish-held enclaves and islands off the Moroccan coast.
Conclusion
This writer is forced to two conclusions. First, the incident genre is
not as novel as one might suppose. Any survey of the literature over the
past fifty years shows a continuing preoccupation with occurrences of
this kind: the nationalization of the Suez Canal; the invasions of Tibet,
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Grenada, Suez, and Chad; the Ice-
landic Cod War; the Pueblo incident; the Entebbe rescue operation; the
seizure of the U.S. hostages in Teheran-the list could be extended indef-
initely. In fact, international lawyers have always studied "incidents"
and tried to assess the objective reactions of the world community to the
rival claims of the interested parties.3 1
Second, the study of international incidents is merely a useful adjunct
to traditional methods of study. It supplements rather than replaces
them. Most norms evolve without "incident" and without overt reaction
29. S.C. Res. 502, 37 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dees. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/38 (1982).
30. See Res. IL Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs (20th mtg.), O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. F/II.20, doe. 80/82 rev. 2 (May 29, 1982).
31. The exposition of a rule of international law must be tested for its conformity with
state practice, an exercise that has always involved looking at how other states act and at how
they react to the conduct of others. The process is not radically changed simply by calling it




by disinterested elites, and so the study of such norms must be by tradi-
tional methods. Above all, we should not delude ourselves into believing
that if only we can adopt the incident method of study the statesmen of
the world will suddenly start listening to what we, as international law-
yers, have to tell them.
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